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In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the Arctic as a
source for resources, as a potential zone for commercial shipping, and as
a region that might experience conflict due to its strategic importance.
With regards to energy resources, some studies suggest that the region
contains upwards of 13 percent of global undiscovered oil, 30 percent of
undiscovered gas, and multiples more of gas hydrates. The decreasing
amount and duration of Arctic ice cover suggests that extraction of these
resources will be increasingly commercially viable. Arctic and non-arctic
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circum-polar navigation possibilities. This has led to concerns about the
environmental risks of these operations as well as the fear that
competition between states for resources might result in conflict.
Unresolved offshore boundaries between the Arctic states exacerbate
these fears. Yet, the risk of conflict seems overstated considering the
bilateral and multilateral steps undertaken by the Arctic states to resolve
contentious issues. This article will examine the potential impact of
Arctic energy resources on global security as well as the regional
environment and examine the actions of concerned states to promote
their interests in the region.
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Arctic Energy Resources: Security 
and Environmental Implications
Peter F. Johnston
Defence Research and Development Canada1
Introduction
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the Arctic as a 
source for resources, a zone of commercial transit, and as the potential 
site of future conflict. Contemporary focus on the region has increased 
because of the apparent reduction in ice-cover and the lengthening of ice-
Abstract
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the Arctic as a 
source for resources, as a potential zone for commercial shipping, and as a 
region that might experience conflict due to its strategic importance. With 
regards to energy resources, some studies suggest that the region contains 
upwards of 13 percent of global undiscovered oil, 30 percent of undiscov-
ered gas, and multiples more of gas hydrates. The decreasing amount and 
duration of Arctic ice cover suggests that extraction of these resources will 
be increasingly commercially viable. Arctic and non-arctic states wish to 
benefit from the region's resources and the potential circum-polar naviga-
tion possibilities. This has led to concerns about the environmental risks 
of these operations as well as the fear that competition between states for 
resources might result in conflict. Unresolved offshore boundaries 
between the Arctic states exacerbate these fears. Yet, the risk of conflict 
seems overstated considering the bilateral and multilateral steps under-
taken by the Arctic states to resolve contentious issues. This article will 
examine the potential impact of Arctic energy resources on global security 
as well as the regional environment and examine the actions of concerned 
states to promote their interests in the region.2
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free navigation periods attributed to climate change. There is speculation 
that this trend will continue and open up the Arctic for more use. Many of 
the analyses concerning the development of this region suggest that it will 
occur with great haste, lead to significant environmental damage, and will 
take place with a heightened risk of conflict amongst the competing pow-
ers. While this view makes for compelling reading, it is dubious for several 
reasons that will be explored below by examining three key components 
to Arctic security.
The first component is the consideration of energy resources. Sources 
forecast that global population and economic growth will continue 
increasing for the future, suggesting that there will also be a rising 
requirement for energy resources to sustain this increase. This has led to 
concerns about how this future energy demand will be met. To meet this 
need, the global oil and gas industry has continued to seek new reserves to 
satisfy the demand for these strategic resources. Since the so-called "easy" 
reserves have been claimed and are subsequently being developed, explo-
ration has taken companies to more remote and challenging oil and gas 
properties. One area that has sparked considerable interest in recent 
years has been the Arctic. This interest is based primarily on the assess-
ment that there are considerable oil and gas resources there, particularly 
offshore, as well as the perception that the ice coverage is diminishing, 
thereby easing access to these reserves. This alignment of factors has 
some observers speculating that there will be a massive increase in Arctic 
oil and gas operations in the near term.
The second component is the examination of Arctic shipping routes. The 
reduced ice coverage has also sparked interest in using the Arctic, particu-
larly the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in Russia's territorial waters, as a 
route for transporting goods between Asia and Europe. This route reduces 
the distance and time required to move these goods to market thereby 
cutting shipping costs. It is anticipated that use of the Arctic for transport-
ing goods will increase dramatically in the coming years.
The third and final component analysed is the issue of boundary disputes 
and the potential for conflict. Complicating the use and development of 
the region are the unresolved boundary disputes among the Arctic coun-
tries. These disagreements have led some analysts and media pundits to 
suggest that there will be an increased likelihood of armed conflict as 
countries and companies vie for resources in contested areas.
This article will deconstruct the perception that Arctic development will 
occur rapidly, accompanied by environmental damage and with much 
potential for conflict, by offering reasons why events might occur in a 
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more benign manner. To accomplish this, the article will examine the 
energy resource potential of the region, the opening of sea transit routes, 
and the likelihood of conflict attributable to Arctic development. Finally, 
the potential environmental risks that the energy and shipping develop-
ments pose to the region will be briefly explored in each of the identified 
sections.
Arctic Energy Resource Developments
Potential Resources
Oil and gas recovery operations have occurred in the Arctic region for sev-
eral decades, making the presence of resources there old news. The com-
bination of climate and terrain has increased the operating costs, thereby 
maintaining a brake on rapid development. The sustained high cost of 
energy resources, especially oil, has renewed the interest of companies 
and some governments in the region. So, too, has the loss of access to 
reserves for International Oil Companies (IOCs) due to the nationaliza-
tion of many areas of the world. The ratio of National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) to IOCs has changed dramatically since the 1970s when the major 
IOCs controlled a majority of global reserves and, in 1972, produced 
roughly 93 percent of global crude. However, this balance was reversed by 
2008 when nationalized companies held approximately 92 percent of 
total global reserves and the NOCs accounted for 81.5 percent of total glo-
bal oil production.3 From these statistics, it is clear that NOCs dominate 
contemporary oil markets. Furthermore, this trend is unlikely to change 
in the near-term given the tendency in countries like Venezuela and Ecua-
dor to continue nationalizing their internal operations as well as the sub-
stantial global reserve acquisition efforts of Chinese, Indian, and other 
NOCs.
Reserve ownership by NOCs does not necessarily exclude participation by 
IOCs in the development of these resources. However, recent history is 
replete with cases where contractual agreements were changed to the dis-
advantage of the IOCs by the host country after significant development 
of the reserves had taken place. Thus, the IOCs put themselves at consid-
erable financial risk entering into agreements with some countries that 
operate nationalized companies. This risk has led many IOCs to seek 
development opportunities in areas that are not controlled by NOCs, and 
many regions of the Arctic meet this criterion.
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IOCs are not the only companies looking to benefit from the potential to 
develop these resources at profit. Two of the Arctic states, Norway and 
Russia, both operate NOCs that are already extensively engaged in opera-
tions in the region. Both Russia and Norway also have plans to increase 
their extraction operations in the Arctic as existing fields in other areas 
mature and become less productive. Indeed, a recently discovered oil field 
in Norway's Barents Sea is estimated to hold 3.66 billion barrels and is 
expected to be producing by 2013.4 For both Russia and Norway, 
expanded operations in the Arctic will enable them to meet ongoing con-
tractual sales obligations. In Russia's case, increased activity in the Arctic 
will also enable it to sell more oil and gas to the Asian market. China is 
another country that operates NOCs and has also expressed interest in 
gaining access to Arctic resources. Hence, the Arctic not only offers 
opportunities for IOCs seeking unclaimed reserves, but also for NOCs 
seeking to maintain or increase their output.
Underlying this interest in the Arctic is the prospect that oil and gas 
resources are present in sufficient quantities to justify the expenditure of 
billions of dollars to develop them. A 2008 United States Geological Sur-
vey (USGS) report suggested that there are substantial amounts of undis-
covered oil and gas throughout the Arctic. The report states that the mean 
estimates indicate "that 90 billion barrels of oil [BBO], 1,669 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may 
remain to be found in the Arctic, of which approximately 84 percent is 
expected to occur offshore."5 This amount represents roughly 13 percent 
of the global mean estimate of undiscovered oil and 40 percent of the glo-
bal mean estimate of undiscovered gas.6 While the amounts that are 
recoverable may vary significantly—either up or down, the potential for 
oil and gas extraction in the Arctic is substantial.
An important resource that was not analyzed in the USGS report is gas 
hydrates, which is another energy source that might become viable in the 
future. It is estimated that there are between 6–600 times the amounts of 
gas hydrates versus conventional gas deposits in the world, so they could 
extend the fossil fuel age well into the future. Gas hydrates are comprised 
of methane and water frozen into a solid beneath the seafloor or under 
permafrost. The methane is concentrated due to the crystal structure of 
the hydrates resulting in a density of 164 m3 of methane gas in each 1 m3 
of methane hydrate, making it much denser than conventional methane 
reserves. However, with contemporary technology, gas hydrates are 
difficult to extract without risking environmental damage—particularly 
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the uncontrolled escape of green house gases. Research to develop a safe 
extraction process continues and may be commercially viable before 
2030, making the Arctic a potential source of future gas hydrate 
exploitation.7
Extraction Challenges
While there are interested parties taking on projects in the region, the 
pace of developments in the Arctic is likely to be slower than many of the 
forecasts suggest. This is primarily due to the two factors examined below. 
The first is the difficult operating environment and climate. The second is 
the availability of other development opportunities in less challenging 
areas.
It is generally believed that Arctic ice cover might become thinner and 
permit longer periods of navigable water than was the case in the past. 
However, the degree to which this will occur remains to be seen. Further-
more, even with reduced ice cover for parts of the year, there will still be a 
substantial amount of ice hampering transportation and operations. This 
ice has a profound effect on operations. It increases costs since the plat-
forms, pipelines, and ships used in the exploration, extraction, and trans-
portation of oil and gas must all be built to a tougher standard in order to 
reduce the risk of destruction or damage from the ice packs. Moreover, a 
system of ice flow monitoring must be put in place to keep watch for ice-
bergs that might cause damage to facilities, equipment, or personnel. 
Strengthened construction and surveillance and warning systems add to 
the cost of operating in the Arctic and reduce the profit margin for oil and 
gas companies.
An additional cost factor related to Arctic operations is the very limited 
drilling season. Generally, weather and ice coverage limits drilling in the 
region to less than two months per year. Hence, for drilling operations to 
take place the equipment has to be transported to a staging area and 
assembled as required prior to the drilling season; this includes the crews 
who have to wait until the ice coverage diminishes sufficiently before 
commencing operations. Since these sites are remote, the transportation 
and sustenance costs are often quite high. Storms or unanticipated ice can 
delay operations or lead to their cancellation. Once the drilling season 
reaches its end, the drilling site must be capped and the rig removed to a 
safe location that could be quite distant from the work area. This cycle 
occurs each year as the wells are drilled, adding significant costs to Arctic 
operations as compared to drilling in other less inhospitable regions.
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Another consideration in the Arctic is the increased challenge of protect-
ing the environment. The region is a very fragile habitat given its unique 
characteristics—waters that are ice-free for limited periods, if at all, and a 
collection of flora and fauna that have adapted to the harsh environment 
and are subsequently unique to the Arctic. The water's depths are also 
generally shallow, creating a situation where any spills would be concen-
trated and their impact potentially more severe than they might be in 
deeper waters where more dissipation occurs. A nightmare scenario 
involving an oil spill covered by ice is also possible. Should this come to 
pass, it could defy detection and clean up for a very long time, thereby 
increasing the damage to the environment.
The sensitive nature of the Arctic environment combined with the 
increased risks posed by the climate and ice necessitates more rigorous 
disaster response protocols than in most other regions. The companies 
operating in the Arctic have taken steps to plan for and prepare to deal 
with spills and other disasters related to accidents. However, these safe-
guards have not been tested in real-life situations, so it is not clear that 
they will be adequate if required. This creates uncertainty over the ability 
to manage accidents and disasters in the region. The British Petroleum 
(BP) Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico is illustrative in 
that the crisis management teams were pushed to the limit and arguably 
not successful in managing the immediate disaster even though this event 
occurred in a region where there was ready access to all types of response 
equipment and personnel.8 It is unlikely that the same resources could be 
so easily accessed in or transported to many parts of the Arctic given its 
remoteness and harsh climate.
The isolation of the region also leads to a transportation challenge, espe-
cially in terms of getting the product to market. Pipelines might be an 
option in some cases, although pipelines across permafrost—particularly 
thawing permafrost—are subject to frost heave or sinking, meaning they 
can buckle and develop leaks as a result. This would increase the risk of 
environmental disaster. Another option is shipping, although that too is 
subject to the vagaries of the local conditions. The Arctic's environment, 
climate, and distance to markets will not only increase the challenges that 
developers face, but will also increase the operating costs. These costs 
might not be prohibitive, but they might dissuade some companies from 
operating in the region.
Finally, the global economy has not fully recovered from the economic 
downturn that struck in 2008, so demand is lower than many analysts 
forecast it would be by this time.9 This situation has already affected the 
long-awaited development of the Shtokman gas field in Russia's Barents 
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Sea sector. The initial plan was for a consortium, controlled by Gazprom 
and including France's Total and Norway's Statoil, to begin marketing 
Shtokman gas in 2013, but this date has been pushed to 2015.10 It 
remains to be seen if the planned investment in Arctic oil and gas opera-
tions will actually occur.
Alternatives to Arctic Energy Investments
Another issue when considering the pace of possible Arctic oil and gas 
operations is the potential for other developments in different parts of the 
world. As noted, there is considerable competition for access to lucrative 
properties. There are other options that are less risky and, therefore, 
might slow the pace of Arctic developments. Some of these alternatives 
are considered in this section.
Perhaps the most influential contemporary development is that of shale 
gas in the United States. Until recently, shale gas was considered too diffi-
cult to extract profitably; however, with improvements in horizontal drill-
ing and hydraulic fracturing (fracking), some of these reserves are now 
commercially viable. Shale gas production in the United States has conse-
quently soared to the point where it comprised roughly 23 percent of gas 
produced in 2010. However, earlier estimates of recoverable shale gas 
reserves in the United States were too high, leading some experts to ques-
tion the sustainability of the resource.11
Shale gas is not limited to the United States. A recent United States 
Energy Information Administration report indicated that there are 48 
shale gas basins in 32 countries. The study further estimated that the 
technically recoverable amount of gas in these basins is 6,622 trillion 
cubic feet (tcf). Total global recoverable gas, not including shale gas, is 
estimated at 16,000 tcf, so the added shale gas boosts the total over 40 
percent to 22,622 tcf.12 Since these estimates were made without substan-
tial drilling, they may be inaccurate. Still, this boost in the global potential 
recoverable gas might reduce the desire of some companies to invest in 
more risky Arctic extraction operations.
There are also questions concerning the environmental sustainability of 
fracking given that its critics suggest that it has a negative impact on the 
environment and water tables. The depletion rate of shale gas reserves is 
also faster than conventional gas reserves, necessitating re-drilling to 
access the resource more frequently than is the case with conventional gas 
operations. These factors might cool the interest and viability in shale gas 
in some areas, although it seems that in other markets production will 
continue to rise. The world is undergoing a slow transition that will see 
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gas replace oil in many uses. Consequently, reliance on gas is expected to 
rise, and this trend might trigger an increase in Arctic gas extraction oper-
ations. However, it seems likely that the short-term focus will be on shale 
gas and other options in more hospitable environments.
Shale gas is only one alternative for companies and countries seeking to 
increase their energy supply. Coal Bed Methane (CBM) extraction tech-
nology has improved to the point where it is becoming viable in areas 
where the resource is present. A longer-term alternative to traditional 
piped gas has been Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) that, along with shale 
gas and CBM, has had a dramatic impact on global gas markets. For 
instance, in some markets gas now trades as a fungible product with spot 
prices instead of prices linked to that of oil, as it did previously. Conse-
quently, gas prices in some markets have dropped significantly in recent 
years. According to a Bloomberg report, prices in North America have 
recently dropped to a 10-year low and market analysts anticipate the price 
to stay near this range at least through 2012.13 However, as the cold 2011–
2012 winter in Europe demonstrated, some markets can still experience 
painful price spikes when demand remains high for long periods. This 
suggests that the development of alternative gas supplies has not perme-
ated the entire global market. Until it does, there may still be pressure to 
push on with Arctic development.
Additionally, there have recently been large conventional gas discoveries 
in areas outside the Arctic. Since the late 2000s, for example, a few key 
discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean offshore have dramatically 
improved the prospects that gas will be developed there in significant 
quantities. In 2009, Noble Energy confirmed that its Tamar field is esti-
mated to contain 238 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas. In 2010, Noble 
announced the discovery of the Leviathan field, also in the eastern Medi-
terranean, with an estimated 453 bcm, making it the largest deepwater 
gas discovery of the last decade.14 While there is considerable investment 
required to develop these fields, and some tensions surrounding the loca-
tion of continental shelf boundaries in the region, it is possible that these 
finds could dramatically alter the balance of gas available to Europe, the 
Middle East, and North Africa in the future.
Although not as plentiful as gas, there are also potential alternative 
options for companies seeking to extract more oil in the future. For exam-
ple, reserves offshore of Brazil are estimated to be significant enough that 
their extraction might put that country near the top of global annual pro-
ducers in the future. Unfortunately, these reserves are found at great 
depth and below thick layers of salt, which creates significant technical 
challenges. However, recent advancements show promise that these hur-
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dles will be overcome in the coming years. Another region that might be 
capable of increased annual production is the Canadian Oil Sands. While 
rendering the bitumen into synthetic crude is energy intensive and more 
expensive than conventional oil production, with consistent sustained 
high prices, oil sands crude production is economically viable and compa-
nies continue to invest and expand operations. The relative political sta-
bility in Canada as compared to other countries with marketable oil 
reserves is a major selling point for many companies.
In addition to options such as Brazil offshore or the Canadian Oil Sands, 
the sustained high price of oil is making many reserves around the 
world—once considered too difficult to extract—now seem viable for pro-
duction. Generally, these reserves, like the gas options mentioned above, 
are located in regions where development can continue year-round, 
thereby lowering the investment risk for companies and offering stable 
supply options for markets.
Thus, while there are prospects for increasing global oil and gas produc-
tion by developing potential Arctic reserves, there are also many compel-
ling reasons that suggest these developments will evolve slowly. For 
instance, the conditions in the Arctic, while increasingly ice-free in some 
regions, are still extremely difficult to operate in and the drilling season is 
quite short compared to other year-round options. The environmental 
risks also increase, contributing to higher cost infrastructure and accident 
response protocols. These factors increase the operating costs in compari-
son to other less restrictive locations. The distance to markets is signifi-
cant in most cases leading to more expenditure on transport or pipelines. 
Finally, while it is true that the so-called "easy oil" is gone, there are still 
lucrative reserves of oil and gas in other parts of the world that often have 
more accommodating circumstances. In light of these considerations, 
development of Arctic oil and gas operations is more likely to occur grad-
ually than rapidly.
Arctic Shipping
Aside from the potential access to resources that the diminishing ice cover 
affords, there is much interest in using the periodic open water to 
enhance global shipping. The opportunity to make use of the Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) in Russia's Arctic waters, as well as the Northwest Pas-
sage (NWP) in Canada's Arctic waters, might dramatically increase the 
amount of shipping that transits the Arctic, particularly between Asia and 
Europe. The NWP could cut as much as 2,500 statute miles off the route 
between Europe and Asia, while the NSR would reduce voyages by 
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approximately 3,000 nautical miles (3,453 statute miles) and save 
roughly twenty-two days sailing time.15 With rising fuel costs, these 
shorter distances would result in significant savings for shippers and 
would enhance supply chains by decreasing the time for products to 
arrive to market. Finally, these routes provide alternatives to the key 
intercontinental shipping chokepoints: The Malacca Strait, Suez Canal, 
and Panama Canal.
Russia is intent on opening up its passage for more shipping traffic. In its 
2009 Arctic strategy document, the Russian Government indicated that 
developing the region's resources and improving the NSR were its funda-
mental goals.16 Expanding the use of the NSR will permit Russia to export 
more of the oil and gas it intends to produce, as well as to market other 
resources extracted in the Russian North. This approach, in turn, will gen-
erate revenue for the Russian ice-breaker fleet since Russia has made 
escort by one of its ice-breakers, for a fee, a requirement for ships transit-
ing the NSR.17 In short, the Russian Government views the opening of 
this route a key component of its revenue generating capacity.
While it is possible that the NWP will open to more frequent commercial 
shipping and could become a regular summer route for commercial ship-
ping, it is not as developed as, nor as ice free for as long a time as is the 
NSR. Given these realities, it seems unlikely that the NWP will experience 
a shipping increase to the same extent as the NSR.
More frequent shipping traffic in the Arctic does entail increased environ-
mental risk, although the degree of risk remains to be seen. It will depend 
on the amount of traffic that opts for these northern lanes, the type of car-
goes, the condition of the vessels, and the extent to which the transits are 
monitored and supported. In the NSR, for example, icebreakers escort 
ships as a matter of routine. This reduces the likelihood of any vessels 
being trapped in the ice. Search and rescue in the Arctic is constrained by 
the vast distances between populated centres and the climate. So, it is 
possible that response to a shipping accident might not be as robust as it 
would be in other more accessible areas. Therefore, while it is logical that 
the risk of accident and thus environmental damage will be heightened 
due to potential increased shipping activity, it remains to be seen what the 
real impact might be.
Another environmental concern will be the increase in pollution resulting 
from more frequent passage of ships. In spite of safeguards and proce-
dures to minimize pollution, it is inevitable that passing ships will leave 
behind some level of pollution, be it minor or major. This, too, will have a 
negative consequence on the region unless it is managed effectively.
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Increased shipping in the Arctic might have positive environmental 
impact elsewhere on the planet. One of the positive aspects of opening up 
these routes is that it will lessen shipping traffic using one of the other 
major chokepoint routes. With fewer vessels on these routes, the local 
environmental risks will be somewhat reduced. Another security related 
benefit that might result from decreased shipping in some regions, partic-
ularly the Malacca Strait, is the potential reduction of piracy. With fewer 
ships passing through, security services will have more time to concen-
trate on anti-piracy activities and pirates will have fewer targets, possibly 
leading some to seek other opportunities. There will be negative impact 
for states that charge transit fees along these routes and the ports and 
businesses that service the ships since diminished traffic will translate 
into reduced revenue, although lost revenue along the traditional routes 
will mean increased revenues in the Arctic region. The degree to which 
these potential outcomes occur will depend on the numbers of ships that 
opt for a northern route over the traditional choices.
Conflict Risk
Discussion of the development of Arctic resources and the opening of the 
region for increased ship transit is replete with suggestions that these 
developments might lead to conflict. Some proponents of this view argue 
that there will be fierce competition between companies and states to 
access reserves in contested areas. Others suggest that there will be a 
struggle between the Arctic states over the disputed boundaries.18 On the 
surface, there may be some justification for these concerns given that the 
boundaries along the continental shelves of the Arctic states have not yet 
been settled. While these speculations make for interesting discussions, 
conflict seems unlikely, barring a major disruptive change in the interna-
tional system.
To understand the potential for conflict, it is necessary to gain an appreci-
ation of where the anticipated oil and gas resources are believed to lie. 
The USGS report mentioned previously outlines this in detail. It suggests 
that the Arctic region is divided into thirds with one-third onshore, one-
third continental shelf, and one-third deep ocean basin. The study also 
notes that the deep ocean basin areas—areas over which there are border 
disagreements—contain few hydrocarbon resources. Most of the 
resources lie on the continental shelves or onshore.19 According to the 
report, 60 percent of the estimated oil resource is located in six locations: 
The Alaska Platform, Canning-Mackenzie Basin, North Barents Basin, 
Northwest Greenland Rifted Margin, South Danmarkshavn Basin, and 
the North Danmarkshavn Salt Basin. Of these, the Alaska Platform is the 
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most significant in that it is estimated to contain approximately 31 per-
cent of the undiscovered Arctic oil. Similarly, approximately 66 percent of 
undiscovered gas is believed to lie in just four areas: The South Kara Sea, 
South Barents Basin, North Barents Basin, and the Alaska Platform. Of 
these, the South Kara Sea, a Russian possession, is believed to contain 
nearly 39 percent of undiscovered gas.20 The borders claimed by the Arc-
tic states are generally not disputed in the areas anticipated to contain sig-
nificant hydrocarbon deposits; hence, neither are the resources that lie 
within them. This somewhat belies the notion that there will be conflict 
over resource deposits in the Arctic.
Moreover, the Arctic countries have agreed to resolve their boundary dis-
putes through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).21 Under UNCLOS, the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) was established to adjudicate the delineation of 
the outer limits of continental shelves and maritime boundaries. Arctic 
states, in turn, must submit their boundary claims to the CLCS within ten 
years of ratifying UNCLOS.22 Russia and Norway have already submitted 
their claims while Canada has until 2013 and Denmark has until 2014 to 
do so. The United States has not ratified UNCLOS because of the concern 
on the part of some senators that doing so would cede too much power to 
the United Nations. The perception that the United States might lose out 
on its claims if it is the only Arctic state not to file a submission to CLCS 
may lead the Senate to agree to ratification in the near-term, although this 
remains to be seen.23 Despite not ratifying UNCLOS, the United States 
joined the other four Arctic states in issuing the Ilulissat Declaration on 
May 28, 2008, affirming that each state would resort to the legal frame-
work of the law of the sea to resolve any claims.24 While the declaration 
did not refer to UNCLOS by name, it did note that the law of the sea is the 
overarching framework to resolve any disputes. The agreement by the 
Arctic states to resolve their disputes through this framework suggests 
that the overlapping boundary issues will be settled amicably, although it 
is likely that they will take some time to be finalized.
Another multilateral forum that the Arctic states make use of to enhance 
cooperation in the region is the Arctic Council. All the region's countries 
are members of the Council through which they periodically meet to dis-
cuss and manage issues that affect the Arctic. Its membership includes 
Canada, Denmark (due to its tie with Greenland and the Faroe Islands), 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Addi-
tionally, there are six permanent observer states including France, Ger-
many, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Other 
states can apply to attend meetings of the Council as observers on an ad 
hoc basis. China has applied for permanent observer status, but its appli-
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cation has not yet been accepted. China is interested in increasing its 
voice regarding Arctic issues since it hopes to benefit from the resource 
potential of the region and the shorter shipping routes. While generally a 
forum for discussion and consultation, the Arctic Council set a milestone 
in May 2011 by signing the Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
Agreement, the first legally binding agreement negotiated under its aus-
pices.25 This agreement will increase the cooperation between the Arctic 
states when search and rescue operations are required. Furthermore, the 
document is indicative of the cooperation amongst the members of the 
Arctic Council.
While there are many examples of cooperation amongst the Arctic states, 
some uncertainty regarding Russia's intentions has persisted. This 
occurred particularly during the first presidency of Vladimir Putin when 
his statements asserting Russia's intent to defend its claims in the Arctic 
stepped up considerably. In fact, some military action did occur to back 
up this rhetoric as noted in the recommencement of long-range bomber 
flights (used extensively throughout the Cold War period) and increased 
activity on the part of Russia's Northern Fleet.26 Additionally, there were 
pledges made to increase the number and role of Russian security forces 
in the region. Perhaps most symbolic of all this activity was the August 
2007 planting of the Russian flag underwater in a contested area of the 
Lomonsov Ridge.27 In addition to these acts, the Russian Government 
also made announcements indicating that they were taking steps to 
enhance border security and their military ground forces in the Arctic. 
These actions were interpreted by the West as potentially hostile and wor-
risome. However, it is important to view them in the context of the set-
backs Russia perceived in the early years of Putin's presidency. Putin, for 
instance, felt slighted by the West over the NATO-led bombing campaign 
against Serbia, as well as by the development of closer ties between 
Ukraine and Georgia and the West. Against this backdrop, Putin's actions 
in the Arctic were in part aimed at shoring up nationalist sentiments in 
Russia in order to support his government rather than sending provoca-
tive signals to Russia's Arctic neighbours. It is useful to compare the very 
militaristic Russian Arctic policy document published in 2001 with the 
one published in 2009. The latter document is far less bellicose than its 
predecessor and refers to cooperation with Arctic neighbours as the pre-
ferred course, suggesting a moderating tone and intent in Russia's Arctic 
policy.28
Russia's actions, more importantly, need to be considered in the context 
of the difficulties that the country faces due to its economic and demo-
graphic challenges. The Russian economy, for instance, is decidedly 
dependent on oil and gas exports, thereby limiting the development of 
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other sectors and leaving it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles. Russia's 
economy is also notoriously corrupt and lacks legal protection for inves-
tors, which reduces its ability to attract new capital and potential business 
partners. Yet, its oil and gas companies need external investors and part-
ners to successfully develop the Arctic reserves. Demographically, Russia 
has suffered from a sustained decline in population that also threatens to 
undermine its economy in the coming years. These structural challenges, 
in turn, have limited Russia's ability to improve its military capabilities.29 
These limits on Russia's national power militate toward a cooperative mil-
itary and diplomatic agenda rather than a confrontational one.
Indeed, a review of Russia's cooperation with its Arctic neighbours rein-
forces this view. Consider that Russia has agreed to work within the 
framework of the UN to settle its delimitation. Russia was also able to 
reach a bilateral agreement with Norway in September 2010 to settle their 
ongoing boundary dispute in the Barents Sea.30 In another announce-
ment around that time, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, affirmed 
Russia's commitment to resolving the boundary dispute with Canada 
regarding the Lamonsov Ridge through the UNCLOS process.31 More-
over, Russia has cooperated with the other Arctic countries to coordinate 
and assist in Arctic search and rescue missions. These are the substantive 
issues pertaining to the Arctic making it clear that Russia has been gener-
ally cooperative despite its occasional provocative rhetoric and associated 
activity.
There are many additional recent examples of cooperation amongst the 
Arctic countries to settle potentially contentious issues. As noted above, 
Russia and Norway were able to bilaterally settle their ongoing Barents 
Sea boundary disagreement. Canada and Denmark have agreed to settle 
their territorial dispute over Hans Island on the boundary between 
Greenland's and Canada's territorial waters. Iceland and Norway agreed 
to jointly develop a potential oil and gas reserve that straddles the bound-
ary between their respective territorial waters. These are all examples of 
the cooperation between the Arctic countries in settling potentially frac-
tious issues and suggest that their relations will continue to be managed 
in a cooperative manner rather than a conflicted one.32
The Chinese Government's desire to access the Arctic resources as well as 
to use the region as an option for the transport of its goods is sometimes 
cited as another conflict risk. China does have a great stake in the Arctic in 
that 46 percent of its GDP is dependent on shipping, and shortened sail-
ing times would enhance its economy significantly. Its economic growth is 
also dependent on energy and other resources that it can obtain from the 
Arctic region. China's support for Iceland during its recent banking crisis 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss3/5
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.3.2</p>
Arctic Energy Resources: Security and Environmental Implications
27
was viewed by many as an attempt by Beijing to gain influence in order to 
use Iceland as a trans-shipment point in the future should the NSR open 
up. The thinking is that Chinese shippers will use very large cargo con-
tainer vessels to cross the Arctic on the NSR, and then divide the cargoes 
to smaller carriers in Iceland to be sent to their final destinations in 
Europe as well as along the Eastern Seaboard of North America.33 In light 
of this, it appears that China is focused on making use of the NSR to move 
its goods to market. China is also interested in seeking out resources in 
the Arctic to sustain its economy. This fits the pattern that the Chinese 
exhibit throughout the world where their firms are busy securing energy 
supplies. The idea that either of these activities should create conflict 
seem unlikely in that China already ships its goods around the world, and 
is already engaged in global energy markets to acquire resources. Neither 
of these activities has led to contemporary conflict with the Chinese nor is 
there currently any reason to suspect they will in the foreseeable future.
A final consideration regarding the potential for conflict in the region is 
the status of the Arctic countries themselves. Both Russia and the United 
States are nuclear weapons powers who possess substantial conventional 
forces, and they hold permanent seats with veto power within the UN 
Security Council. Five of the Arctic Council members also belong to 
NATO; these include: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the United 
States. Another member of the Arctic Council, Sweden, cooperates closely 
with NATO. It seems unlikely that any country would risk starting a con-
flict in such a strategic environment.
Conclusion
There are potentially large reserves of gas and oil in the Arctic region that 
will be developed in the future. However, given the difficult operating 
conditions due to the climate and geography, it seems that this develop-
ment will take place gradually rather than rapidly as some analysts sug-
gest. Aside from the difficult operational environment, there are other 
options outside of the Arctic, as noted above, that will occupy some of the 
companies that might otherwise invest in the Arctic region. The degree to 
which these trends will impact the pace of Arctic development is not clear 
but it seems likely that development will occur slowly.
Another issue that will place limits on the pace of Arctic oil and gas devel-
opment is the heightened environmental risk that these operations 
involve. While companies have contingency plans, equipment, and some 
Arctic-specific emergency response procedures developed, these have not 
been tested in a real situation creating some uncertainty regarding the 
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ability to manage accidents in the region. Given that BP is still settling its 
liabilities stemming from the recent disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, it 
seems likely that other companies will tread cautiously in the Arctic due 
to the risk of environmental disaster. This is not to say that these concerns 
will halt activity in the region, but it appears likely that new operations 
will evolve slowly in order to mitigate environmental risk and subsequent 
loss of revenue due to any mishap.
There is additional uncertainty surrounding the potential for conflict 
between Arctic countries or others from outside the region. While there 
has been various provocative actions and rhetoric in the recent past by 
some of the Arctic countries, it seems that these occurred for domestic 
political consumption more than they were intended as signals to other 
countries. Indeed, the record of cooperation amongst the Arctic countries 
in resolving contentious issues to date has been good. Moreover, these 
countries have all agreed to abide by the UNCLOS to resolve the 
delimitation of their continental shelves. In fact, the generally accepted 
study on the oil and gas deposits in the regions suggest that most of the 
major reserves will be found within the continental shelf areas of the 
Arctic countries in areas that are not contested. This suggests that most of 
the development will occur in regions not likely to result in tensions or 
conflicts.
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